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Kagami Sascha Rosylight 2023-06-14 00:22:39 +02:00
parent aa87fb2f50
commit 20efdc78e2
2 changed files with 55 additions and 13 deletions
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26
packages/backend/src/server/oauth/OAuth2ProviderService.ts
View file

@ -36,9 +36,13 @@ function validateClientId(raw: string): URL {
})();
// Client identifier URLs MUST have either an https or http scheme
// XXX: but why allow http in 2023?
if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be either https or http URL', 'invalid_request');
// But then again:
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-3.1.2.1
// 'The redirection endpoint SHOULD require the use of TLS as described
// in Section 1.6 when the requested response type is "code" or "token"'
const allowedProtocols = process.env.NODE_ENV === 'test' ? ['http:', 'https:'] : ['https:'];
if (!allowedProtocols.includes(url.protocol)) {
throw new AuthorizationError('client_id must be a valid HTTPS URL', 'invalid_request');
}
// MUST contain a path component (new URL() implicitly adds one)
@ -116,7 +120,10 @@ interface OAuthRequest extends OAuth2Req {
function getQueryMode(issuerUrl: string): oauth2orize.grant.Options['modes'] {
return {
query: (txn, res, params): void => {
// RFC 9207
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9207#name-response-parameter-iss
// "In authorization responses to the client, including error responses,
// an authorization server supporting this specification MUST indicate its
// identity by including the iss parameter in the response."
params.iss = issuerUrl;
const parsed = new URL(txn.redirectURI);
@ -188,6 +195,7 @@ export class OAuth2ProviderService {
scopes: string[],
}>(1000 * 60 * 5); // 5m
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636.html
this.#server.grant(oauth2Pkce.extensions());
this.#server.grant(oauth2orize.grant.code({
modes: getQueryMode(config.url),
@ -307,10 +315,14 @@ export class OAuth2ProviderService {
const clientUrl = validateClientId(clientID);
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test' || process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_DISALLOW_LOOPBACK === '1') {
// TODO: Consider allowing this for native apps (RFC 8252)
// The current setup requires an explicit list of redirect_uris per
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics#section-4.1.3
// which blocks the support. But we could loose the rule in this case.
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test' || process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_CHECK_IP_RANGE === '1') {
const lookup = await dns.lookup(clientUrl.hostname);
if (ipaddr.parse(lookup.address).range() === 'loopback') {
throw new AuthorizationError('client_id unexpectedly resolves to loopback IP.', 'invalid_request');
if (ipaddr.parse(lookup.address).range() !== 'unicast') {
throw new AuthorizationError('client_id resolves to disallowed IP range.', 'invalid_request');
}
}

42
packages/backend/test/e2e/oauth.ts
View file

@ -121,7 +121,10 @@ function assertIndirectError(response: Response, error: string): void {
const location = new URL(locationHeader);
assert.strictEqual(location.searchParams.get('error'), error);
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9207#name-response-parameter-iss
assert.strictEqual(location.searchParams.get('iss'), 'http://misskey.local');
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-4.1.2.1
assert.ok(location.searchParams.has('state'));
}
@ -146,7 +149,7 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
}, 1000 * 60 * 2);
beforeEach(async () => {
process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_DISALLOW_LOOPBACK = '';
process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_CHECK_IP_RANGE = '';
fastify = Fastify();
fastify.get('/', async (request, reply) => {
reply.send(`
@ -196,7 +199,8 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
assert.strictEqual(location.origin + location.pathname, redirect_uri);
assert.ok(location.searchParams.has('code'));
assert.strictEqual(location.searchParams.get('state'), 'state');
assert.strictEqual(location.searchParams.get('iss'), 'http://misskey.local'); // RFC 9207
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9207#name-response-parameter-iss
assert.strictEqual(location.searchParams.get('iss'), 'http://misskey.local');
const code = new URL(location).searchParams.get('code');
assert.ok(code);
@ -299,7 +303,11 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
assert.strictEqual(createResponseBodyBob.createdNote.user.username, 'bob');
});
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636.html
describe('PKCE', () => {
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636.html#section-4.4.1
// '... the authorization endpoint MUST return the authorization
// error response with the "error" value set to "invalid_request".'
test('Require PKCE', async () => {
const client = getClient();
@ -425,7 +433,13 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
assert.ok(location.searchParams.has('error'));
});
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-3.3
describe('Scope', () => {
// "If the client omits the scope parameter when requesting
// authorization, the authorization server MUST either process the
// request using a pre-defined default value or fail the request
// indicating an invalid scope."
// (And Misskey does the latter)
test('Missing scope', async () => {
const client = getClient();
@ -464,6 +478,11 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
assertIndirectError(response, 'invalid_scope');
});
// "If the issued access token scope
// is different from the one requested by the client, the authorization
// server MUST include the "scope" response parameter to inform the
// client of the actual scope granted."
// (Although Misskey always return scope, which is also fine)
test('Partially known scopes', async () => {
const { code_challenge, code_verifier } = await pkceChallenge(128);
@ -480,8 +499,6 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
code_verifier,
} as AuthorizationTokenConfigExtended);
// OAuth2 requires returning `scope` in the token response if the resulting scope is different than the requested one
// (Although Misskey always return scope, which is also fine)
assert.strictEqual(token.token.scope, 'write:notes');
});
@ -541,6 +558,7 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
});
});
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6750.html
test('Authorization header', async () => {
const { code_challenge, code_verifier } = await pkceChallenge(128);
@ -572,12 +590,22 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
},
body: JSON.stringify({ text: 'test' }),
});
// RFC 6750 section 3.1 says 401 but it's SHOULD not MUST. 403 should be okay for now.
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6750.html#section-3.1
// "The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or
// invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD respond with
// the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code."
// (but it's SHOULD not MUST. 403 should be okay for now.)
assert.strictEqual(createResponse.status, 403);
// TODO: error code (wrong Authorization header should emit OAuth error instead of Misskey API error)
});
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749.html#section-3.1.2.4
// "If an authorization request fails validation due to a missing,
// invalid, or mismatching redirection URI, the authorization server
// SHOULD inform the resource owner of the error and MUST NOT
// automatically redirect the user-agent to the invalid redirection URI."
describe('Redirection', () => {
test('Invalid redirect_uri at authorization endpoint', async () => {
const client = getClient();
@ -653,6 +681,7 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
});
});
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414
test('Server metadata', async () => {
const response = await fetch(new URL('.well-known/oauth-authorization-server', host));
assert.strictEqual(response.status, 200);
@ -717,6 +746,7 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
});
});
// https://indieauth.spec.indieweb.org/#client-information-discovery
describe('Client Information Discovery', () => {
describe('Redirection', () => {
const tests: Record<string, (reply: FastifyReply) => void> = {
@ -801,7 +831,7 @@ describe('OAuth', () => {
});
test('Disallow loopback', async () => {
process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_DISALLOW_LOOPBACK = '1';
process.env.MISSKEY_TEST_CHECK_IP_RANGE = '1';
const client = getClient();
const response = await fetch(client.authorizeURL({